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INTRODUCTION

As the famous plaque adorning the Statue of Liberty suggests, the
United States has long welcomed the disenfranchised masses emigrating
from other nations, seeking to find their fortunes in the New World.
Since its founding, the United States has greeted millions of immigrants,
both legal and illegal, documented and undocumented, and provided
them with protection, opportunity, and refuge from economic and societal troubles in their countries of origin. While a humanitarian desire to
assist destitute peoples may have partially motivated this liberal immigration tradition, such policy very likely reflected an additional consideration: a pragmatic acknowledgment that a population influx was
necessary to populate a sparsely inhabited frontier and to provide labor
for a rapidly expanding industrialized society.' At the same time,

although practical thinking undoubtedly influenced the development of
an open-door policy initially, humanitarian interests eventually began to
play a clearly discernible, if smaller, role in furthering migration to the
United States through asylum, a narrow entry path for select individuals
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Marjorie 0. Rendell, United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, 2010-11 Term; J.D. 2008, The University of Chicago Law School, High Honors,
Order of the Coif,B.A. 2003, Northwestern University, magna cum laude. The author immigrated
to the United States with refugee status from the Soviet Union, greatly benefiting from some of
the asylum provisions discussed in this Essay. Eric Posner, Jane Y. Ginns, and Dean David Zarfes
provided generous feedback and exceptional insight. This Essay is dedicated to Dr. Olga T.

Sukenik and Liliya and Dmitry Sukenik for inspiration and invaluable support.
1. Kathleen A. Connolly, In Search of the American Dream: An Examination of
Undocumented Students, In-State Tuition, and the Dream Act, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 193, 197 n.26

(2005).
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who are subject to persecution in their homelands.2
Refugees who are granted asylum receive permanent resident status
with all the rights and privileges pertaining thereto, including freedom
from the fear of deportation, the right to work, and a path to eventual
citizenship.' For many otherwise ineligible migrants, asylum affords a
new lease on life. Eligibility criteria are relatively straightforward and
include a "one-year deadline on applying for asylum, delay in work
authorization eligibility, prompt adjudication of asylum applications,
expedited removal, and detention of asylum seekers."' Precisely because
asylum is so attractive to many refugees, however, the United States'
generosity has frequently been rewarded with widespread abuse by
unscrupulous and non-meritorious applicants.' Efforts to reform, streamline, and tighten the asylum adjudication process emerged as a result.6
Although these changes reduced "the number of non-meritorious filings
... and the size of the [applicant] backlog,"' such reforms relied in large

part on foundation data and thinking dating back to the Cold War period.
In the face of these efforts, the dawn of the terrorism age threatens to
significantly change both the asylum playing field and the game itself.
The development and proliferation of international terrorism suggests that an increasing number of aliens will be driven to seek refuge in
the United States and will be able to satisfy the statutory requirement for
asylum: that a refugee "suffered past persecution or . . . has a well-

founded fear of future persecution."' At the same time, advances in technology and the easing of restrictions on international travel have made it
easier and cheaper to cross borders without detection to gain the foothold on United States soil necessary to make an asylum application a
reality.' This timely confluence of needs and means forecasts a poten2. Immigration & Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006).
3. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006).
4. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Counterproductive and Counterintuitive Counterterrorism:
The Post-September 11 Treatment of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, 84 DENv. U. L. REv. 1121,

1133 (2007) (discussing Congress's passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996).
5. Lamar Smith & Edward R. Grant, Immigration Reform: Seeking the Right Reasons, 28

L.J. 883, 894-95 (1997) (noting that after the liberalization of U.S. asylum and
refugee policy in 1980, aliens "quickly learned how to abuse the system" by showing up at
"airports with fraudulent or even no travel documents," and being "provided authorization to work
in the United States" pending delayed hearings).
ST. MARY'S

6. John Fredriksson, Bridging the Gap Between Rights and Responsibilities: Policy Changes
Affecting Refugees and Immigrants in the United States Since 1996, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 757,

772-73 (2000) (noting a "seventy-five percent decline in the number of asylum applications"
between 1993 and 1999).
7. Id. at 772.
8. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2007).
9. Priscilla Steward, Note, Access Rights: A Necessary Corollary to Custody Rights Under
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 21 FORDHAM INT'L
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tially overwhelming number of eligible refugees swelling the ranks of
asylum applicants. In turn, immigration administrators will be compelled to pick and choose amongst similarly qualified aliens without
clearly delineated grounds for distinguishing these refugees from terrorists. Forcing government officials to adjudicate an expanding quantity
of asylum applications on potentially arbitrary and capricious grounds
runs the risk of paralyzing, or at least derailing, an already severely
strained immigration system. A substantial increase in asylum admissions would also result in considerable integration costs, which the government and the voting public would likely find unreasonable to bear in
the absence of significant advancement of national interests.
This Essay argues that the continuation of global terrorism is likely
to exacerbate the practical weaknesses in the asylum system, while at the
same time imperiling the normative arguments in favor of granting asylum to refugees fleeing terrorism-inspired persecution.'o By applying
existing asylum law and its legislative underpinnings to the factual realities of the terrorism age, this Essay will demonstrate the inherent tensions between the general humanitarian policy interests supporting
asylum policy and the geo-political and practical national interests
implicated by refugee admission. More narrowly, this Essay proposes
that humanitarian policy concerns alone do not justify the extension of
asylum law to encompass the terrorism refugee population.
Part II of this Essay discusses the historical origins and evolution of
the use of terrorism in modern times and its effect on failing nationstates. Part III illustrates how the statutory framework underlying asylum law and policy renders the United States vulnerable to an onslaught
of refugees fleeing terrorism and an unanticipated expansion of asylum
law. Part IV then analyzes both the evolution and rationale at the core of
asylum law, highlighting and explaining how congressional tinkering
with asylum regulations attempted to expand the scope of asylum eligibility despite perverse consequences for immigration policy. Part V
explains the normative costs of asylum policy, arguing that despite the
absence of national interest or direct moral imperative, the broad scope
of current asylum law incentivizes illegal entry and leads to arbitrary
adjudication. Part V also suggests several statutory and policy proposals
for improving and streamlining the administration of asylum. Finally,
this Essay concludes that although the sentiment and policy underpinL.J. 308, 315 n.37 (1997) (citing articles discussing greater mobility and relaxation of travel
restrictions).
10. Although central to the modem era, this Essay does not address the propriety or
effectiveness of counterterrorism actions undertaken by the United States, focusing solely upon
the ramifications of terrorism for asylum policy. Also, for the sake of brevity, this Essay does not
examine the impact of terrorism upon asylum policy in European or other Western nations.
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ning asylum law is both appropriate and commendable, the dawn of
widespread political and religious terrorism has rendered the current
asylum system precariously in danger of collapse.
II.

RISE OF THE TERRORISM AGE

The use of terrorism and its associated forms of violence and intimidation as a means of political advancement has a long and transnational
history. Indeed, the word terroriste first entered modem lexicon in
describing the Jacobins and the Reign of Terror during the French
Revolution at the end of the Eighteenth Century." Equally long has
been the struggle to prevent future terrorist attacks and to punish perpetrators for physical, psychological, and financial wounds inflicted. 12 In
line with this history, the United States has long suffered from and
responded to both domestic and international terrorism." But despite
extensive prior experience, only the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 stimulated the widespread domestic realization that America was
not immune to terrorism.14 In the context of United States policy, September 11th further demonstrated the weaknesses of the current system,
whereby the well-financed al-Qaeda perpetrators exploited the existing
legal framework and went undetected in legally crossing the United
States border and mixing with the local populations."
Interestingly, and perhaps not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks, "[a]lthough Americans regularly dealt with heightened
terror alerts and news of terrorism in foreign countries, with each passing day when no 9/11-type events occurred locally, the feeling that the
country was shielded from attacks [began] to creep back into the
national psyche .... ."16 The absence of large-scale domestic terrorism
11. Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 435, 437 n.2 (2005).
12. Symposium, America Fights Back: The Legal Issues, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
831, 843-44, 847 (2004) (discussing a long history of combating terrorism through both criminal
law and warfare).
13. See, e.g., Steven G. Brandl, Back to the Future: The Implications of September 11, 2001
on Law Enforcement Practiceand Policy, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 141 (2003) ("In the recent
history of terrorism, the villains have changed-America's attention has moved from the

Ayatollah Khomeini, to Carlos the Jackal, to Abu Nidal, to Moammar Kaddafi, to Osama bin
Laden."); Jennifer Van Bergen & Douglas Valentine, The Dangerous World of Indefinite
Detentions: Vietnam to Abu Ghraib,37 CASE. W. REs. J. INT'L L. 449, 500 (2006) (discussing the

United States' short-term and long-term military commitments, economic pressures, and arms
sales in terrorism crises involving Lebanon and the Middle East, Central America, and Africa).
14. See Brandl, supra note 13, at 142.
15. Raquel Adana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, "Aliens" in Our Midst Post-9/11: Legislating
Outsiderness Within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1683, 1696 (2005) ("[Tlhe 9/11 report

ma[de] clear the hijackers entered the United States with valid visitors' visas in the comfort of
airline seats.").
16. Eugene Kim, Comment, The New York City Police Department's Random Bag Search
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did nothing to alter this perception." But the reality on the global stage
was far different. "In the intervening eight years [since 2001], the world
has seen an exponential increase in terrorist activity . . . ."" As a result

of this escalation, large population centers are now consistently, if
unpredictably, exposed to this suddenly common form of violence and
intimidation.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the unstable global hot spots
of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan." Perhaps not immediately obvious, but
central to this Essay, the proclivity for terrorist violence in these failing
nation-states has broad implications for domestic asylum policy in the
United States. In the past, asylum law applied mainly to those specifically and directly targeted or at risk for persecution. 20 The situations in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan, however, show that, tragically, entire
populaces are now directly vulnerable to asylum-eligible persecution
based on some combination of ethnic, religious, or political discrimination. In addition, those affected by terrorism generally lack both the
means of escaping these precarious situations within their homeland as
well as the ability to seek government solace from the rampant
persecution.
Since the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003, common Iraqis
have been exposed to a daily torrent of car bombings, random killings,
Policy: Withstanding Fourth Amendment Scrutiny Is Only the First Step in Combating Terrorism,

37

SETON HALL

L. REv. 561, 565 (2007).

17. See generally Michelle Ward Ghetti, The TerroristIs a Star!: Regulating Media Coverage
of Publicity-Seeking Crimes, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 481, 482 n.7 (2008) (noting that "terrorist crime

in the United States has decreased since 1982, although international terrorism has increased.").
18. Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism
and Using UniversalJurisdictionas a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 116-17 (2010);
see also Susan B. Glasser, U.S. Figures Show Sharp Global Rise in Terrorism-StateDept. Will
Not Put Data in Report, WASH. PosT, Apr. 27, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/article/2005/04/26/AR2005042601623.html.
19. See, e.g., Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization Through Trialsfor Violations of
InternationalLaw: Four Conditionsfor Success and Their Application to Trials of Detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 427, 461 (2009) ("The U.S. National Counterterrorism

Center ('NCTC') 2008 Report on Terrorism found that 55% of the 11,800 terrorist attacks
committed in 2008 took place in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan."); John Norris, Getting It Right:
What the United States Can Do To Prevent Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity in the
Twenty-First Century, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 417, 429-30 (2009) ("[T]he plight of Darfuris

who continued to be driven from their homes and killed in large numbers.").
20. See, e.g., Nicole S. Thompson, Due Process Problems Caused by Large Disparities in
Grants of Asylum: Will New Department of Justice Recommendations Solve the Problem?, 22

L. REv. 385, 398 (2008) ("The asylum seeker must demonstrate individual
circumstances showing he was or would be a target for persecution."); Arlene Kanter & Kristin
Dadey, The Right to Asylum for People with Disabilities, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 1117, 1121 (2000)
("[T]he applicant must meet the burden of providing either direct or circumstantial evidence from
which it is reasonable to conclude that the individual had been persecuted in the past or fears
persecution in the future . . . .").
EMORY INT'L
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targeted assassinations, and other deprivations of both rights and life.21
Many of these terrorist acts have been and continue to be motivated by
religious, ethnic, and political differences along Shi'ite, Sunni, and
Kurdish sectarian lines.2 2 Apart from the dead, the unabated terrorist
violence has resulted in over four million refugees attempting to flee to
neighboring and distant countries alike.23 The striking severity of the
situation results from the absolute unpredictability of terrorist attacks
and the capricious, but targeted, killing of all Iraqis. Although there has
been recent progress, the government is still unable-and often unwilling-to provide adequate assurances of future safety.24
Almost identically, Afghanis are constantly reminded of their perilous situation. Acts of terrorism target common civilians based upon their
religious and political affiliation, and specifically, opposition to the
Taliban's rule and rejection of the Taliban's strict interpretation of
Islam.2 5 Among the innumerable terrorist offenses perpetrated against
Afghani civilians are "forced deportation; massacres; torture; extrajudicial executions . . . religious and ethnic persecution of the [minority

Shiite Muslims]; [and] politicide . . . ."26 Consequently, approximately
21. See Jeremy Sarkin & Heather Sensibaugh, How Historical Events and Relationships
Shape Current Attempts at Reconciliation in Iraq, 26 Wis. INT'L. L.J. 1033, 1033-35 (2009).
22. See generally id. at 1071 ("America's Iraq policy has created innocent victims and has

lumped together insurgents based on sectarian identities, when political motivations are more
important than religion."); Timothy G. Burroughs, Turning Away from Islam in Iraq: A
Conjecture as to How the New Iraq Will Treat Muslim Apostates, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 517, 521

(2008) ("[T]he branding of others as infidels ... has been an ideological underpinning of the
terrorism and sectarian killings in Iraq.").
23. See, e.g., Eleanor E. Downes, Fulfilling the Promise?: When HumanitarianObligations
and Foreign Policy Goals Conflict in the United States, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 477, 490
(2007) (reviewing MARIA CRISTINA GARCIA, SEEKING REFUGE: CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRATION
TO MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND CANADA (2006)) (noting that a substantial number of Iraqi
refugees fled to Syria, Jordan, "Australia, Denmark, Germany, Iran, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States."); Cara Buckley, Red Crescent Says 25,000
Iraqi Refugees Have Returned, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/04/
world/middleeast/04iraq.html; David M. Brown, U.N. Focuses Efforts on Iraq Refugee Crisis,
Prrr. TRIB. REv., Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/
Westmoreland/s_533492.html.
24. Major Michael D. Banks, Addressing States (Ir-)responsibility:The Use of Military Force
as Self-Defense in InternationalCounter-TerrorismOperations, 200 Mi.. L. REV. 54, 105 (2009)
("Iraq ... provide[s] [an] example[ I of [a] State[ ] that [is] unwilling or unable to act effectively

against the terrorist organizations present within [its] borders.").
25. See, e.g., Taimoor Shah & Carlotta Gall, At Least 80 Are Killed in Afghan Suicide
Bombing, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/world/asia/I8afghan.

html (noting that militant suicide attacks have risen in Afghanistan with militants executing over
140 suicide attacks in 2007); Carlotta Gall & Eric Schmitt, Taliban Step Up Afghan Bombings and
Suicide Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/21/intemationall
middleeast/21afghan.html (noting an increase in terrorist activity, including beheadings, throat
cuttings, and assassinations of religious and tribal leaders).
26. Mark A. Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for the Women of
Afghanistan, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 349, 356-57 (2004).
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two million refugees are currently hosted in Pakistan, almost one million
in Iran, and over ten thousand in India.2 7 Since a majority of the country
is effectively outside the national government's control-and many terrorists operate directly from neighboring Pakistan, a sovereign statemost Afghanis have a justifiable fear of future injury, but are unable to
seek refuge from a weak and impotent government.2 8
Similarly, in the Sudan, "[t]he government of Sudan has supported
and orchestrated years of mass murder, rape, and the displacement of
hundreds of thousands of Darfurians, "29 a group ethnically distinct from
the largely Arab northern Sudanese.o As a result, almost three million
people have been displaced with several hundred thousand killed." In
contrast with conventional civil wars of the Cold War era, the victims of
this ethnic cleansing are persecuted by government-sponsored militias
and mercenary terrorists based on ethnic and cultural distinctions, as
well as due to traditional political opportunism.3 2 Attempts by the
afflicted to flee to neighboring countries have created a significant diaspora of vulnerable refugees unable to seek protection from their government, their indirect persecutor.
Although distinguishable on the facts and causes, all three conflicts
evince a common principle: targeted persecution of entire populations in
furtherance of particular religious, sectarian, or political objectives.
Importantly, although many of the refugees have presently relocated to
27. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE ET AL., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FiscAL YEAR 2009:
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 44 (2009) [hereinafter PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS 2009].

28. James Kitfield, The Neglected Front, NAT'L J., Feb. 9, 2008, at 36, 38.
29. Mary T. Reynolds, Note, Legitimizing the ICC: Supporting the Court's Prosecution of
Those Responsible in Darfur, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 179, 206 (2010).
30. Jamie A. Mathew, The Darfur Debate: Whether the ICC Should Determine that the
Atrocities in Darfur Constitute Genocide, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 517, 539 (2006) ("[Tlhe United

States and the United Nations . . . pronounc[ed] that the tribes victimized in Darfur are a distinct
ethnic group from their attackers and the conflict is based on ethnicity.").
31. Colum Lynch, InternationalCriminal Court To Issue Arrest Warrantfor Sudan's Bashir,

WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/1 1/
AR200902110395 1.html.
32. See, e.g., Noah Bialostozky, Overcoming Collective Action Failure in the Security
Council: Would Direct Regional Representation Better Protect Universal Human Rights?, 15

BUF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 3 n. 10 (2009) ("[G]overnment forces and the Janjaweed have waged a
systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing against the civilian population of Darfur, Sudan.");
Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How CorporateComplicity Liability Under the
Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 208 (2008)

(noting that the Sudanese government committed genocide and ethnic cleansing in part "to clear
areas surrounding its oil concessions in Southern Sudan.").
33. See Iraq: Rhetoric and Reality: The IraqiRefugee Crisis, 8 (June 15, 2008), http://www.

amnesty.org/enlibrary/asset/MDE14/011/2008/en/2e602733-42da- lldd-9452-091b75948109/md
e140112008eng.pdf; 2007 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returnees, Internally
Displacedand Stateless Persons,7 (June 17, 2008), http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/
4852366f2.pdf.
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neighboring countries, their presence in these nations is undeniably tenuous and temporary. Generally, such refugees lack legal status and most
basic rights in the host countries.34 More recently, many host nationsresponding to domestic pressure-have begun to restrict entry and to
make life utterly untenable for the fleeing diasporas, pressuring the refugees to either return to their home country or to resettle elsewhere.
Witnessing no abatement in terrorist violence in any of the failing
nations, these refugees will inevitably require an alternative locale for
resettlement at some point in the near future.
Current asylum law provides that these refugees would find such an
opportunity for settlement in the United States. Indeed, the number of
refugee arrivals in the United States has increased from a low of 26,776
in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks in 2002, to
60,108 refugee arrivals in 2008.36 Similarly, the number of individuals
granted asylum has almost tripled since the end of the Cold War period
in 1990.17 Accordingly, the continuing escalation of terrorist persecution
will likely increase the number of refugees seeking refuge in the United
States.

III.

ASYLUM

LAW

COVERAGE

To determine whether the emergence and proliferation of modern
terrorism renders the United States vulnerable to an onslaught of refugees from the aforementioned nations, it is imperative first to understand
the scope of eligibility requirements for asylum. At its core, modern
asylum policy is supposed to reflect the United States' traditional role as
a haven of freedom from persecution. By providing refuge and opportunity, this policy is intended to signify the nation's position as a global
defender of human rights and freedoms, particularly in comparison to
other less-generous hegemons. Accordingly, in 1980, Congress amended
the original Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") to include a sec34. Roberta Cohen, Iraq's Displaced: Where To Turn?, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 301, 310

(2008).
35. Id. at 307-08; Lauren Fouda, Compulsory Voluntary Repatriation: Why Temporary
Protection for Sudanese Asylum-Seekers in Cairo Amounts to Refoulement, 14 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 511, 527 (2007) (discussing UNHCR's and Egypt's limited allocation of

funds for refugee services); Meri Melissi Hartley-Blecic, The Invisible Women: The Taliban's
Oppression of Women in Afghanistan, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 553, 580 (2001) (discussing
abuses of Afghani refugees in Pakistan, including denial of aid, bribery, rape, theft, and assault).
36. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF IMMIGR. STAT., 2008 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATIsTIcs 40 (2009) [hereinafter 2008 IMMIGRATION STATISTICS].

37. Id. at 43. The report notes that 8472 individuals received asylum in 1990, compared to
22,930 individuals who received asylum in 2008. Id. Importantly, these statistics exclude
information pertaining to the total number of asylum applicants, merely tracking the number
actually granted asylum.
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tion defining refugees, thereby enabling the immigration administrators
to better determine whether a particular applicant qualified for asylum.
Including the revision, the current INA states:
The term "refugee" means ... any person who is outside any country
of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no
nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion ....
Interpreting this statutory language, the Board of Immigration
Appeals succinctly summarized the four primary elements that an applicant claiming asylum as a refugee must satisfy: (1) the applicant must
have a fear of persecution; (2) this fear must be well-founded; (3) the
persecution must be motivated by race, religion, nationality, membership in a specific social group, or political opinion; and (4) the asylum
applicant must be unable to return to the country of his nationality or last
residence due to the established or well-founded fear of persecution.4 0
Additionally, the asylum applicant carries the burden of proof to establish that he or she fulfills the above elements; these may be demonstrated through either credible testimony of the applicant or through
corroborating evidence.4 1
An individual may qualify as a refugee and receive asylum regardless of whether the applicant is outside the territorial boundaries of
the United States or within. A person seeking protection in the United
States, while physically outside the country, may be admitted through
the Overseas Refugee Program by satisfying the above requirements of
section 1101(a)(42).42 Alternatively, an individual already physically
present in the United States may receive asylum by affirmatively demonstrating their status as a refugee, also within the meaning of the same
statutory section.4 3
Section 110 1(a)(42)'s requirement of persecution is particularly relevant for understanding the state of United States asylum law in the
terrorism age. As an initial matter, an asylum applicant must advance
"specific facts demonstrating that he has actually been the victim o[f]
38. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, §§ 201(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102-03 (1980)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42) (1980)).
39. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42) (2006).
40. See, e.g., In re Sanchez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 276, 283 (BIA 1985).
41. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2007).
42. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1)-(4) (2006).
43. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (2006).
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persecution or has good reason to believe that he will be singled out for
persecution."" Among others, some actions that "rise above mere harassment" to constitute persecution include "detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of
property, surveillance, beatings, or torture."4 5 There is some disagreement among the courts regarding the specific types of behavior that constitute persecution in each individual situation.4 6 Nevertheless, it is well
established that an asylum applicant must only present a "subjectively
genuine and objectively reasonable fear" of cognizable persecution to
receive asylum.4 7 The Supreme Court has further clarified that "so long
as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be
shown that the situation will probably result in persecution; it is enough
that persecution is a reasonable possibility."48 Additionally, an "alien
who establishes past persecution" is logically "presumed to have a wellfounded fear of persecution." 4 9
Importantly, the federal regulations governing asylum explicitly
provide that "the asylum officer or immigration judge shall not require
the applicant to provide evidence that there is a reasonable possibility he
or she would be singled out individually for persecution,"o a circumstance particularly applicable to asylum applicants fleeing wide-spread
terrorism." So long as the applicant establishes a "pattern or practice in
[the asylum applicant's] country . . . of persecution of a group of persons

similarly situated to the applicant," and can establish "his or her own
inclusion in, and identification with, such group of persons," the asylum
seeker can easily establish past persecution and a reasonable fear of per44. Roman v. INS, 233 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
45. See, e.g., Begzatowski v. INS, 278 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal citations
omitted).
46. Compare Tamas-Mercea v. Reno, 222 F.3d 417, 424 (7th Cir. 2000) (defining persecution
as "punishment or the infliction of harm for political, religious, or other reasons that this country
does not recognize as legitimate") (internal citations omitted) with Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425,
1431 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that "persecution is an extreme concept that does not include every
sort of treatment our society regards as offensive") (internal citation omitted).
47. Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted);
see also Pieterson v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2004).
48. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (rejecting a "more likely than not"
standard and finding that "a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted" may
suffice to establish well-founded fear) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
49. See, e.g., Avetova-Elisseva, 213 F.3d at 1195 (internal citation omitted); Gomes v.
Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746, 753 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted).
50. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii) (2007) (emphasis added).
51. Certainly, where a refugee fleeing one of the terrorism affected nations can demonstrate
an individualized fear of persecution, such candidate would qualify for asylum in the same way as
any other applicant with a well-founded individualized fear of persecution. This Essay focuses
primarily upon applicants who cannot demonstrate individualized danger apart from the terrorism
targeting their religious, ethnic, racial, national, or political group.
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secution upon return.5 2
Pursuant to the statutory text, refugees fleeing terrorism in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Sudan would qualify for refugee treatment. As discussed, in the three mentioned countries, among others, terrorism and
violence are daily occurrences affecting entire communities without any
advanced warning. Such terrorist activity can take on various iterations
of potential cruelty and viciousness, but undeniably targets civilians
based precisely on the sectarian, religious, national or political distinctions protected by the INA." As a result, wide swaths of refugees fleeing these terrorism-prone states could persuasively argue that for
persons similarly situated, persecution-in the form of possible death,
injury, and torture-is at least a "reasonable possibility" in their home
country, 54 if not an apparent probability in many contexts. Under these
circumstances, the refugees could demonstrate the requisite "subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable" fear of being persecuted necessary for claiming and receiving asylum in the United States.
Moreover, as terrorism continues unabated in each nation, the refugees
could demonstrate an inability to repatriate without exposing themselves
to a reasonable possibility of persecution. As such, the multitude of prospective refugees applying for asylum on the basis of a legitimate fear of
terrorism in their home country would likely satisfy the legal definition
for a "well-founded fear" of persecution.56
Significantly for this terrorism analysis, "[t]here is no rule requiring
that persecution actually be directed by the state or by an organized
political party."" Nonetheless, absent direct government involvement in
52. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)-(B); see also Pieterson, 364 F.3d at 44; Ndom v.
Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 743, 754 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding particularized prosecution unnecessary to
demonstrate persecution even in the context of prevalent violence, as long as the applicant
demonstrates a "[personal] nexus to a protected ground[s]."); M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 858 F.2d
210, 214 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding it unnecessary for an asylum applicant to prove fear of being
singled out for persecution if evidence exists that "members of his group, which includes those
with the same political beliefs of the petitioner, are routinely subject to persecution") (internal
citation omitted).
53. In many instances, innocent bystanders are targeted based upon their presence in a
particular ethnic section of the country or their participation in activities dominated by specific
ethnic groups.
54. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
55. See Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citation
omitted).
56. See, e.g., Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 453-55 (6th Cir. 2007) (Merritt, J. concurring)
(noting that persecution of a religious and ethnic minority by insurgents and Muslim extremist
organizations may constitute grounds for granting asylum in light of the "climate of extreme
violence" existing in Iraq).
57. Bace v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1133, 1138 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding persecution where ousted
politician was subjected to injuries, threats, and torture by politically-motivated attackers for
refusing to certify an election).

90

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:79

the alleged persecution, an alien applicant must still satisfy an important
requirement of the asylum statute: that the alien applicant be unable to
avail himself of the protection of the government. Persecution occurs
when a government, either directly or by abetting private discrimination,
"provid[es] protection so ineffectual that it becomes a sensible inference
that the government sponsors the misconduct." 59 In fact, to be considered persecution, an applicant must come forward with evidence establishing a clear connection between the alleged actions and the
government by showing that the authorities were either unwilling or
unable to protect the victim against the private actors.60 Therefore, while
persecution does not need to be perpetrated by the government unequivocally, an applicant claiming persecution by private individuals is not
"persecuted" under the asylum statute unless the government either condones the attacks or is "complete[ly] helpless[ ]" to protect the victim. 6 1
Since many terrorist acts are perpetrated by non-governmental
actors in a chaotic political environment, individuals can reasonably
claim persecution by private individuals in spite of the government's
lack of direct control or participation in the terrorist activity. In fact, the
situations in the three aforementioned countries represent paradigmatic
instances of government inability or unwillingness to protect potential
victims from terrorist and insurgent persecution. As evidenced over the
last several years, both Iraq and Afghanistan lack the means and the
energy to protect many of their residents from terrorist activity. Similarly, the Sudanese government has more than turned a blind eye to the
plight of the refugees in the Darfur region, directly providing financial
and military assistance to the militias perpetrating the majority of the
ethnic cleansing.62 In each context, the governments are "complete[ly]
helpless[ ]"163 or unwilling to prevent terrorist attacks that target civilian
58. 2 AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW & BUSINESS § 7:9 (2008); see also
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3)(i)-(ii) (2007).
59. See, e.g., Hor v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that a ruling party
member could not avail himself of future protection in his home country regardless of his political
affiliation).
60. Harutyunyan v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 2005) (failing to find the necessary
connection to government inaction or inability); Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir.
2005) (finding that government's unwillingness or inability to control private actors is a "factual
question that must be resolved based on the record in each case"); Khachaturyan v. Ashcroft, 86 F.
App'x 207, 211 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that an asylum applicant failed to show that the
government "either orchestrated or sanctioned" the actions by failing to offer assistance).
61. Roman v. INS, 233 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000) (declining to find persecution where
the beating of a political activist, rather than being orchestrated or sanctioned by the authorities,
was actually perpetrated by three miners protesting the government's democratic reforms)
(internal citation omitted).

62. See Lydia Polgreen, Scorched-Earth Strategy Returns to Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,

2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/world/africa/02darfur.html.
63. See Roman, 233 F.3d at 1034.
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populations. Because such potential asylum applicants could satisfy the
statutory requirement that they be unable to avail themselves of the protection of the government,"M refugees from these regions could demonstrate that they cannot return to their home country due to a tangible fear
of terrorist violence and persecution, as required by federal
administrators.6 5
Finally, the last statutory element for qualifying for asylum is the
requirement of belonging to or identifying with a targeted race, religion,
nationality, or particular social group, or holding a certain political opinion.66 As previously discussed, asylum applicants fleeing the situations
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan are motivated to flee terrorist persecution precisely by the enumerated racial, religious, ethnic, and political
affiliations. Therefore, if considering the statutory language alone, these
refugees are to be accorded the protection of the United States' asylum
law, so long as they can demonstrate the requisite fear of persecution
discussed above.
A potential obstacle to claiming asylum based upon the type of
terrorism described above results from judicial reticence at attributing
asylum eligibility to "random danger faced by the population as a whole
. . . ."67 Historically, asylum applicants needed to demonstrate an individualized fear of persecution to receive asylum in the United States. 8
And some courts interpreted the asylum regulations discussed above to
require "specific information showing a real threat of individual persecution," 69 rather than accepting as sufficient evidence of persecution to a
similarly situated general population. Indeed, administrators and courts
could potentially exercise their discretion generally to preclude the
application of asylum law to refugees fleeing terrorism.
Such an approach, however, ignores both the statutory text of the
federal regulations, as well as the reality that terrorism presents a unique
quandary due to its wide scope and effect. A refugee fleeing the aforementioned terrorism-riddled states would encounter little difficulty demonstrating a "'pattern or practice . . . of persecution of a group of

persons similarly situated to the applicant,"'o specifically motivated by
sectarian, religious, or politically oriented impulses. The most recent
64. See Hor, 400 F.3d at 485.
65. See In re Sanchez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 276 (BIA 1985).
66. 8 C.F.R § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)-(B) (2007); 3 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.04[4] (Matthew Bender rev. ed., 2010).

67. Odisho v. Gonzales, 206 F. App'x 465, 470 (6th Cir. 2006); see also M.A. A26851062 v.
INS, 899 F.2d 304, 315 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that courts generally reject asylum applications
based on fears of general violence).
68. Odisho, 206 F. App'x at 470.
69. Id. (internal citation omitted).
70. Sugiarto v. Holder, 586 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)).
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jurisprudence emphasizes that "[t]he idea behind the 'pattern or practice'
exception to the individualized proof requirement is that, where the persecution of a group on the basis of a protected ground is sufficiently
widespread, a 'reasonable possibility' of persecution is evident and evidence of individualized targeting becomes unnecessary."" A refugee
from terrorism is not attempting to escape random violence or the general civil strife that previously occupied asylum administrators and
courts during the Cold War. Instead, modern terrorism presents the requisite "pattern or practice"7 2 of unavoidable persecution premised on
discriminatory and protected grounds. Indeed, "'[t]he more evidence of
group targeting an . . . applicant proffers, the less evidence of individu-

ally specific evidence [s]he needs to [satisfy her ultimate burden of
proof].' " Accordingly, in the terrorism context, the severity of targeting of disfavored groups undermines the counter argument that a refugee
from one of the highlighted countries must advance "individually specific evidence" of certain persecution."
The consequences of "threat[s] to an individual's life or freedom
[are] not lessened by the fact that the individual resides in a country
where the lives and freedom of a large number of persons are
threatened."" Such an actuality may actually heighten the credibility of
a fear of persecution.76 At bottom, the terrorism context implicates the
asylum laws presenting a legitimate fear of persecution targeting ethnically, religiously, or politically distinct individuals.
IV.

PURPOSES UNDERLYING ASYLUM LAW

Considering the potentially broad applicability of asylum regulations to the multitude of prospective asylum applicants wrought by the
terrorism age, whether asylum law should, on a normative level, shield
refugees fleeing terrorism becomes the salient question. Section III
established that the asylum laws, if read for their plain meaning, seemingly apply to most refugees from terrorism-prone nations. Thus, before
answering the normative question, it is prudent first to determine
71. Id. at 97 (citing Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 203 (4th Cir. 1999)); see also, Vakeesan v.

Holder, 343 F. App'x 117, 126 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that "[a]n alien 'may prevail on his asylum
claim even without credible evidence' of potential individualized persecution) (quoting
Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606, 620 (7th Cir. 2009)).
72. Sugiarto, 586 F.3d at 97.
73. Tampubolon v. Holder, 598 F.3d 521, 527 (quoting Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049,
1064 (9th Cir. 2009)), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g by 610 F.3d 1056 (9th

Cir. 2010).
74. Id.
75. Bolanos-Hemandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984).
76. Id.
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whether Congress, in crafting the regulations, actually intended or would
have intended to protect such refugees from domestic persecution.
While the final text of a statute should usually reflect the legislative
purpose," where congressional intent is ambiguous and difficult to
immediately discern from the plain text, administrative agencies and
courts often rely upon "the legislative history underlying its passage" to
determine legislative intentions." By turning to such extrinsic evidence,
it may be possible to gauge how Congress-the framer of the United
States' asylum policy-would resolve the instant question if it were to
consider the matter at the present time.
In the instant situation, the legislative history offers very little guidance to recommend an alternative resolution of the salient question versus that suggested by the plain text, namely, that refugees from
terrorism-prone countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan are eligible for asylum in the United States. In the run-up to the enactment of the
1980 Refugee Act, Congress struggled with a fragmented refugee admissions policy and considered various bills intended to protect persecuted
refugees.so The legislative history of these bills provides guidance for
understanding the motivations that ultimately led to the enactment of the
1980 Act. In one instance of such precursor asylum legislation, Congressman Peter Rodino, a strong advocate for the ultimate 1980 legislation, highlighted Congress's concern for "uphold[ing] America's
tradition as an asylum for the oppressed," and for offering "quick, effective, and affirmative action to permit the orderly entry into the United
States of a fair share of refugees seeking freedom."81 Similarly, the
designers and administrators of alternative, but comparable, asylum legislation emphasized the "national ethos of humanitarian concern for the
77. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) ("In construing statutes, 'we must, of
course, start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning
of the words used."' (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962))).
78. Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NoTRE

DAME L. REV. 1971, 1974 (2007). Cross also observes that the use of legislative history reflects "a
relatively minimalist approach to decisionmaking." Id. at 1972; see also Stephen Breyer, On the
Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 848 (1992)

(discussing the benefits of legislative history in helping "a court understand the context and
purpose of a statute").
79. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 636-40 (1990)
(noting that the hierarchy of legislative sources correlates with the comparative reliability of each
source).
80. See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History

of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DEGo L. REV. 9 (1981) (analyzing legal responses to refugee
and asylum issues in the post-World War H context).
81. Kathryn M. Bockley, Comment, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation: The
Deception of Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C. J. Ir'L L. & COM. REG. 253, 280

(1995) (statement Rep. Peter W. Rodino).
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uprooted and persecuted." 8 2 A subsequent draft of asylum legislation
emphasized the responsibility to protect aliens "uprooted by catastrophic
natural calamity, civil disturbance or military operations and who [are]
unable to return to [their] usual place of abode."83 Numerous other legislative comments to the various differing bills underscore the humanitarian concerns underlying all asylum legislation, confirming the earlier
observation that the protection of terrorism refugees is an important
national value.
In finally reaching a compromise by enacting the comprehensive
1980 Refugee Act, Congress specifically indicated its intent to abide by
"the historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of
persons subject to persecution in their homelands." 8 4 The Act codified
"an historic tenet of American political policy,"" "consistent with this
country's tradition of welcoming the oppressed of other nations," 8 6 and
confirmed the nation's "'deep dedication . . . [and] concern for the

homeless, the defenseless, and the persecuted peoples who fall victim to
8
tyrannical and oppressive governmental regimes.' ""
The broad statutory text adopted in the final legislation and discussed in Section III
reflects these policy interests.
Considering the aforementioned goals, millions of refugees from
terrorist-prone areas could plausibly argue that they constitute the
oppressed and persecuted individuals for whom Congress expressed
such innate concern. As targets of terrorists motivated by ethnic, racial,
and political stimuli, these refugees could credibly assert that they are
defenseless and unable to return to their countries of origin due to a
well-founded fear of persecution. Moreover, refugees from Iraq and
Afghanistan in particular could persuasively advance an additional argument: that they are entitled to particular solicitude considering the
United States' involvement in contributing to the authority vacuum that
factored in the oppressive terrorist campaigns.
One could counter, on the other hand, that Congress's concern for
protecting defenseless refugees related specifically to the Cold War era
concerns of the time of passage. Lacking clairvoyance, the legislators'
then-current political dialogue-as expressed through the legislative his82. Robert G. Rooney, The Power to Pretermit an Application for Asylum: Improper Policy

for American Asylum Law, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 641, 652 n.78 (1991) (statement of James Carlin).
83. Refugee and Displaced Persons Act of 1978, S. 2751, 95th Cong., 124 CONG. REc. 3746
(1978).
84. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
85. Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on International
Operations of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong. 186 (1979) (statement of David

Carliner, General Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
86. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 17 (1979).
87. Anker & Posner, supra note 80, at 63 (citing 126 CONG. REC. 1519, 1522 (1980)).

2010]

MARGINAL REFUGE

95

tory-did not and could not have anticipated the effects of modern terrorism on refugee populations. Accordingly, the humanitarian concerns
expressed should not be extrapolated to apply to the instant
environment.
Although plausible, this view partially ignores the statutory evolution and the language ultimately enacted by Congress in the 1980 Refugee Act, whatever the policy considerations may have been. In fact, the
transformation of the federal regulations provides further guidance in
deciphering Congress's disputed intent to cover asylum situations borne
out of modern terrorism. Prior to the enactment of the 1980 Act,
"America's declared refugee policy was expressly anti-Communist,"
intended to undermine the legitimacy of communist regimes while bolstering the humanitarian credentials of the United States."' While the
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees focused
primarily upon persecution in determining refugee status, the precursor
to the 1980 Refugee Act-the United States Refugee Relief Act of
1953-departed from this "nonpartisan approach," and instead "specified that refugees must come from communist or communist-dominated
countries." 9 The 1980 bill eliminated such favoritism for communistrelated refugees. The legislation noted that the Cold War definition was
"clearly unresponsive to the current diversity of refugee populations and
[did] not adequately reflect the United States' traditional humanitarian
concern for refugees throughout the world."9 o
This update to the language considerably broadened the scope of
asylum law to a wider array of refugees, providing numerous persecuted
individuals with a previously unavailable opportunity to apply for asylum in the United States regardless of their nation of origin. Notably, the
elimination of the communism requirement buttresses the argument that
the millions fleeing terrorist persecution in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan
constitute some of the many diverse populations outside the realm of the
communist-dominated world considered by Congress. As such, from a
legislative intent standpoint, Congress may have intended to consider
these refugees eligible for asylum.
Moreover, along with eliminating preferences for migrants from
communist countries, the 1980 Act further tracked the United Nations
definition of a refugee in adopting the now common requirement for
"persecution or a 'well-founded fear' of persecution."91 The prior incar88. Kenneth D. Brill, Note, The Endless Debate: Refugee Law and Policy and the 1980
Refugee Act, 32 CLEV. Sr. L. REv. 117, 119 (1983).
89. Id. at 122; see also Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 203-336, § 2(a)-(c), 67 Stat.
400 (1953).
90. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 9.
91. Downes, supra note 23, at 484 (internal citation omitted).
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nations of immigration law required an asylum applicant to demonstrate
a "clear probability" that he would be targeted for persecution if not
granted asylum. 92 The Supreme Court, basing its decision upon an
extensive review of the legislative history and administrative and judicial statements on the matter, determined that Congress intended the
updated standard to be more generous to asylum applicants than the previous "clear probability" standard. 93 As such, the Court lowered the burden of proof for asylum petitioners. Consequently, a well-founded fear
of persecution may now be found upon the mere showing of a "reasonable possibility" of persecution. 94
This element of congressional intent is particularly significant for
applicants seeking asylum from terrorist persecution. Although many
refugees who fled the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan could
arguably persuade a court of a clear probability that the general protected group to which they belong would be targeted by terrorists based
on their race, religion, or political membership, the government would
counter that an individual could not prove the clear probability of being
harmed by a terrorist attack. In contrast, considering the sheer number of
terrorist attacks and the millions who fled their homes out of a wellfounded fear, a potential asylum applicant would, at a minimum, be able
to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of being targeted in a terrorist
attack in their home country. While the true meaning of a reasonable
well-founded fear can only be determined through case-by-case adjudication, 95 the amendment suggests that Congress's abandonment of the
"clear probability" standard was purposely intended to increase the likelihood of receiving asylum in circumstances where individual persecution is difficult to establish, such as the instant terrorist persecution
scenario.
Considering the several aforementioned factors, the legislative history appears to suggest that Congress's intent would have been to cover
victims of terrorist persecution through asylum law. In fact, the history
intimates that Congress passed the 1980 Refugee Act to expand the
scope and availability of asylum to a broader subset of peoples in line
with the United States' tradition of welcoming the persecuted and
oppressed. Alternatively, the statutory evolution and the history may
merely suggest an inability by the legislators to grasp or "address every
important policy question that might arise under their statutes." 9 6
Indeed, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that in crafting the 1980
92.
93.
94.
95.

INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984).
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 421 (1987).
Id. at 440 (citing Stevic, 467 U.S. at 424-25).
Id. at 448.

96. Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and
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Refugee Act, Congress may not have fathomed the ramifications of its
textual choices for future situations where entire populaces are targeted
by terrorists based upon religious, racial, or political distinctions.
Despite the persuasive weight bestowed upon legislative history, it is
neither a necessarily accurate predictor of current legislative behavior,
nor can it properly balance the policy factors affecting present-day
implementation of asylum law. While the statutory language and legislative narration seemingly afford solicitude to refugees fleeing terrorism,
asylum law should not operate in a policy vacuum where the benefits are
clearly outweighed by the detriments.
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR REFUGEE POLICY

Even if existing law might apply to the multitude of refugees fleeing terrorist-inspired conflicts under both the textual reading of the statute and pursuant to congressional intent, the question remains whether it
is sound policy to apply the asylum laws to refugees from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan. From both a practical and normative perspective, the
answer is no.
A.

Numerical Restrictions Encourage Arbitrary Judgments
and Illegal Entry

Presently, millions of potential asylum applicants are in exile, having fled their homes due to racial, religious, or politically-motivated terrorist persecution.9 8 From a practical standpoint, current asylum law is
not responsive to this terrorism-created reality, which raises two predicaments for the United States. The first concern is that having satisfied the
legal requirements for eligibility under the relevant statute, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1157, the processing and admission of many of these refugees would
entail reliance upon arbitrary distinctions. The second concern is the
anxiety that the mass of refugees discussed above may now seek asylum
in the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation,96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1239,
1241 (2002).

97. See id. at 1253-54, 1296 (discussing James Madison's observation in the Federalist that
"'[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and
most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal[,] .. . until their
meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.').
98. See, e.g., Hannibal Travis, After Regime Change: United States Law and Policy
Regarding IraqiRefugees, 2003-2008, 55 WAYNE L. REv. 1007, 1008-09 (2009) (noting that "2.5

million refugees had fled Iraq" by 2008 due to an increase "of persecution on religious, sectarian,
and ethnic grounds."); William Kirtley, The Tampa Incident: The Legality of Ruddock v. Vadarlis
Under InternationalLaw and the Implications of Australia's New Asylum Policy, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 251, 258 (2002) (noting that 3.6 million Afghanis fled persecution "'from one of

the world's most repressive regimes'") (internal citations omitted).
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On both points, the fear that terrorist persecution will result in "substantially greater refugee admissions than the country could absorb" is
not unreasonable.99 But, Congress partially allayed this anxiety in passing the 1980 refugee legislation. There, Congress noted that "merely
because an individual or group of refugees comes within the definition
[for asylum] will not guarantee resettlement in the United States.""
Pursuant to the 1980 Refugee Act, total annual refugee admissions are
limited by two formulas. As an initial matter, the President, after consultation with Congress, may allocate a specific number of refugee admissions as "justified by humanitarian concerns or . .. other[ ] . . . national
0 In recent years, the refugee
interest[s]" at the start of each fiscal year.o'
admissions allotment has called for 80,000 refugee admissions, divided
among applicants from Africa, East Asia, Central Asia, Europe, Latin
America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and an unallocated reserve. 02
. Alternatively, the statute authorizes the President, after further cabinet-level consultation with Congress, to admit additional refugees if he
determines that an emergency refugee situation exists and the additional

admissions are "justified by grave humanitarian concerns or . .. national

interest."' 03 These additional refugees may then be admitted during "the
succeeding twelve months as refugees of special humanitarian concern."' 04 Both methods of admission clearly limit the ability of refugees
to gain authorized access to the United States, reducing the likelihood
that innumerable refugees from countries severely affected by terrorism
would flood the United States by using the legal process.
The notable loophole in this procedure, however, is that the numerical restrictions only apply to aliens seeking refugee status while outside
the United States. Indeed, the numerical restrictions discussed above are
"for persons designated as refugees outside of the United States and subsequently issued refugee visas for admission to the United States,"
through the previously mentioned Overseas Refugee Program. 0" In contrast, refugees who gain access to the United States through alternative
routes may apply for asylum without counting against the allocation
restrictions, regardless of the legality of the means used to enter the
United States.1 06 As such, assuming the millions of refugees fleeing terrorist persecution in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan could each demon99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 10 (1979).
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (2006).
PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS 2009, supra note 27, at 19.

8 U.S.C. § 1157(b) (2006).

104. GORDON Er AL., supra note 66, at § 33.04(8)(a).

105. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1157.
106. GORDON ET AL., supra note 66, at § 33.04(8)(a); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-58 (2006).
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strate sufficient fear of persecution,"o' such refugees would be eligible
for asylum in the United States in numbers directly proportional to the
number capable of reaching United States territory.
Regardless of the means by which individuals fleeing terrorism
seek asylum in the United States, the existing laws fail to provide a
flexible framework for adjusting admissions to account for increased
demand. As previously mentioned, in addition to the refugees seeking
asylum from within the United States, the overseas refugee admissions
allotment calls for 80,000 refugee admissions annually; these admissions
are divided amongst every continent.' Even if a small fraction of the
millions of eligible refugees sought asylum, the government would
encounter tremendous difficulty in distinguishing among a multitude of
eligible individuals, each expressing a similar justified, but general, fear
of terrorist persecution in their homeland. Considering the strict numencal limitations for refugee admission, government administrators would
be forced to pick and choose a limited number of applicants deemed
most deserving of asylum in the United States.
Yet despite this pressure, it is unclear how government authorities
would distinguish among these refugees. Pursuant to federal regulations,
immigration judges and asylum officers exercise wide discretion in
granting or denying asylum-the decision is based upon a personal
interview with the applicant and corroborating documents and evidence.' 09 This exercise of discretion through the adjudication of asylum
cases has often "fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice," in
the words of Judge Posner." 0 Indeed, for cases referred by asylum
officers to immigration judges, the asylum officer corps holds an error
rate of over 50%, signifying a profound failure to adequately understand
and adjudicate valid requests for protection."' As a result, several Circuit Courts of Appeals have expressed dismay at the "pattern of arbitrary, unlawful, and biased rulings" in asylum adjudication.' 12 The
potential influx of numerous similarly situated refugees would likely
exacerbate the already seeming prevalence of arbitrary decision-making
by asylum administrators. Since, as demonstrated above, a significant
107. See discussion supra Part III.
108. PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMIssIONs 2009, supra note 27, at 19.

109. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (2007).
110. David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1359,
1390 (2007).
111. Rachel D. Settlage, Affirmatively Denied: The Detrimental Effects of a Reduced Grant
Rate for Affirmative Asylum Seekers, 27 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 61, 104-05 (2009) (noting that many
asylum officers lack "an educational background that is appropriate for their decision-making
authority," namely, a law degree).
112. Zaring & Baylis, supra note 110, at 1390 (citing Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 531
(7th Cir. 2005) and Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627 (3d Cir. 2006)).
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number of these refugees could demonstrate the legally-mandated wellfounded fear of persecution based on sectarian, religious, or political
terrorism, the allocation limits indicate that numerous applicants would
likely be rejected based upon a particular administrator's subjectiveand often arbitrary-decision.
This result is unsurprising considering that the drafters of the 1980
legislation and its progeny could not have anticipated that millions of
refugees would at the same time become eligible for asylum due to terrorism. Nevertheless, in light of the realities of the terrorism age, this
situation presents a potential obstacle to achieving the United States'
traditional mission of offering an asylum for those truly oppressed.
Besides the administrative burden of adjudicating asylum applications from terrorism refugees, the perverse incentive for refugees to
physically enter the United States for purposes of seeking asylum is a
further potential weakness of current policy. Technological advances
and the easing of international travel restrictions are making access to
the United States and its European allies less expensive, less burdensome, and very achievable."' In addition, the prevalence of illegal
immigrants in the United States from impoverished countries throughout
the world confirms that current immigration and border controls are
largely incapable of preventing, or are unwilling to prevent, motivated
individuals from attaining admission.11 4 Arguably, few individuals are
more motivated to enter the United States than those fleeing terrorism
targeted at their religious, ethnic, or political group."' Moreover, as evidenced by al-Qaeda's prior success in legally placing its operatives
within the United States, many refugees could potentially gain admission on temporary legal visas and subsequently request asylum. While
most aliens who overstay their visas and illegal immigrants apprehended
in the United States are eventually deported, refugees fleeing terrorist
persecution would have a legitimate legal claim for remaining in the
113. See Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor
Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 357 (2001) (discussing the

"technological advancements that make it easier and less expensive for people to travel great
distances"); Ryszard Piotrowicz, The UNHCR's Guidelnes on Human Trafficking, 20 Irr'L J.
REFuGEE L. 242, 242 (2008) (observing how the collapse of the Eastern Bloc resulted in greatly
relaxed travel restrictions and "led to significant movements of people generally from east to west
..... ); Alexandra Amiel, Integrating a Human Rights Perspective into the European Approach to
Combating the Trafficking of Women for Sexual Exploitation, 12 Bure. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 5, 11

(2006) ("The lifting on travel restrictions and the opening up of borders have made it easier to
enter the E.U. and move freely within it.").
114. Joel P. Trachtman, Toward International Order in Migration and Trade?, 101 AM. Soc'v

L. PROC. 301, 302 (2007) (noting "the ease of evading enforcement of legal restrictions" in
international migration).
115. See generally id. (arguing that pressure to emigrate and general demand for migration is
increasing due to human rights violations and domestic insecurity in poor nations).
INT'L
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United States and even for eventually receiving permanent residency

status.1 16

Although the United States has experienced a dramatic increase in
refugee and asylum admission,"' it has not yet been overwhelmed with
refugees. In fact, while millions of refugees from Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Sudan technically qualify for asylum under applicable federal provisions, this reality has not translated into increases in overseas refugee
admission from these countries between 2001 and 2005, the height of
the refugee crises. Before September 11, 2001, the United States admitted 2473 Iraqis,"' 2954 Afghanis," 9 and 5959 Sudanese refugees 20 .
While terrorism and persecution in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan considerably increased thereafter, the United States gradually reduced refugee
admissions from these terrorism-prone countries by 2005, admitting
only 198 refugees from Iraq, 902 from Afghanistan, and 2205 from the
Sudan. 12 ' The decreases were likely motivated in part by national selfinterest. By limiting the number of refugees admitted from Iraq and
Afghanistan, the United States avoided the impression that its involvement created a refugee crisis, requiring the resettlement of many foreign
nationals in the United States. 122 Such a strategy also advanced the argument that conditions in the afflicted countries were improving due to the
American government's efforts, despite evidence to the contrary.1 23
Additionally, the United States may have limited admissions from the
terrorism-prone nations due to fears of potential terrorists sneaking into
the country by pretending to be refugees. 124 In any event, it is evident
that the Cold War-era rules created a significant disconnect between
legal eligibility for obtaining asylum and the actual attainment of refugee protection.
The numerical impact may soon change, however, particularly in
the context of refugees gaining physical entry to the United States prior
to applying for asylum. As discussed, until recently, countries bordering
the terrorism conflict zones willingly, albeit unhappily, hosted millions
116. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2006).
117. See supra Part II.
118. Meital Waibsnaider, Note, How National Self-Interest and Foreign Policy Continue To
Influence the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 391, 412 n.187 (2006).

119. Id.
120. 2008
121. Id.

IMMIGRATION STATISTIcs, supra

note 36, at 40.

122. See Daniel L. Swanwick, Note, Foreign Policy and Humanitarianism in U.S. Asylum
Adjudication: Revisiting the Debate in the Wake of the War on Terror, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 129

(2006) (discussing the effect of foreign policy considerations upon the administration of asylum
laws); Waibsnaider, supra note 118, at 423 (arguing that decreased admissions from Iraq and
Afghanistan correlate to the United States' interests).
123. See Waibsnaider, supra note 118, at 422-23.
124. See id. at 422.
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of refugees.1 25 As the eagerness of these nations to continue their
humanitarian mission wanes, the demand for resettlement and asylum
elsewhere will logically increase multifold. Because many refugees will
be unable or unwilling to return to their home countries, refugee social
networks can play "a central role" in migration decisions. 12 6 In fact,
social networks "are the most important source of information about
destination countries" for asylum seekers, who "are unlikely to trust
information disseminated by formal institutions."l 2 7 As information pertaining to the liberal asylum policy offered by the United States for those
physically present within its borders percolates through the new refugee
communities, the United States is likely to see a gradual increase in the
quantity of asylum applications from terrorism refugees pursuant to section 1158's numerically-unlimited asylum procedure rather than section
1157's restricted Overseas Refugee Program.
In this climate, domestic law enforcement surrenders control over
the influx of refugees, which becomes contingent upon external forces,
namely, the severity of persecution in foreign countries, the willingness
of third-party host countries to continue to house the refugees, the proximity of affected asylum seekers to the United States, and the willingness of neighboring nations to regulate their own borders, among others.
While a plausible argument could be advanced that the probability of the
nation being immediately overrun with illegally-admitted refugees is relatively small, such relinquishment of immigration control suggests that
the asylum laws are nonetheless improperly suited to manage the
humanitarian refugee crises arising in the terrorism age.
B.

Doubtful National Interests and Moral Imperatives

Concurrent with the practical difficulties of administering asylum
policy in the terrorism age, the normative question of whether the asylum laws should protect terrorism refugees becomes salient. Because the
granting of asylum to such refugees appears to serve different national
interests than traditional asylum, the answer to this question counsels
against an expansion of asylum's function. In the post-World War II era,
when refugee and asylum policy first gained recognition as an important
government priority, asylum became primarily tied to advancing United
125. Travis, supra note 98, at 1028-29; see also
note 27.

PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS

2009, supra
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States foreign policy interests. 1 28 In line with the Cold War priorities of
the time, the United States focused on admitting refugees from communist-dominated nations as part of a campaign of "psychological warfare"
against the Soviet Union and its leadership. 129 By encouraging emigration from Eastern Bloc and allied nations, asylum policy endeavored to
undermine the legitimacy and esteem of the communist construct. 130
Moreover, in striving to cultivate a positive global image, the granting of
asylum to refugees fleeing communist states served to brand such states
as oppressive persecutors, thereby furthering the appeal of democracy
and capitalism as superior systems of government.13 ' In this effort, the
United States and other Western nations deliberately incorporated language in the United Nations asylum regulations, including the terms
"well-founded fear" and "persecution," to obtain a political advantage
against the USSR.13 2 Thus, each time it granted asylum based on the
aforementioned grounds, the United States insinuated condemnation of a
refugee's state of origin.133
The advancement of these foreign policy considerations served as
the basis for granting asylum to hundreds of thousands of refugees until
the 1980 Refugee Act, which, as discussed in Section IV above,
attempted to expand asylum eligibility to greater numbers of refugees
and to minimize the emphasis on foreign policy as the motivating basis
for granting asylum. Yet despite the language updates reflecting greater
attention to altruistic humanitarian concerns, foreign policy considerations continued to play an intrinsic role in asylum decisions. Refugees
from communist dominated regimes continued to receive asylum in disproportionately higher percentages than refugees from countries with
which the United States enjoyed non-hostile relations.413
In the instant situation, there is minimal evidence to suggest that
the grant of asylum to refugees from terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, or
Sudan would promote the foreign policy objectives that motivated refugee policy for the duration of the Twentieth Century. With the collapse
of communism, there is no longer a clearly identifiable enemy whose
interests and legitimacy could be undermined simply by accepting refu128.
asylum
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 110, at 1385 (discussing the historical development of
policy and its relevance to the current geopolitical climate).
Bockley, supra note 81, at 262.
Id.
See Swanwick, supra note 122, at 130.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (using such language).

133. Matthew E. Price, Politics or Humanitarianism? Recovering the Political Roots of
Asylum, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 309-10 (2004).
134. Arthur C. Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise,

17 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 243, 253 (1984) (discussing the continued role of geopolitical
considerations after the 1980 reforms).
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gees. Because terrorism is usually perpetrated by either non-governmental organizations or by governments disinterested in international
prestige, the granting of asylum to refugees fleeing such persecution
would not serve to undermine or vilify any powerful nation-state or ideology. Additionally, considering the violent and often revolting tactics
utilized by terrorist groups, United States asylum policy would be
unlikely to further delegitimize organizations already viewed with disdain in the majority of the world. Similarly, asylum policy would minimally affect supporters of terrorism, who likely would view the refugee
policy as a sign of weakness, an inability by the United States and its
allies to protect Iraqi, Afghan, and Sudanese refugees in their partially
occupied homelands.
An argument could be made that asylum policy "still presents an
opportunity to cultivate an image of the United States as a 'beacon for
freedom,"'135 particularly in certain regions of the world where the
United States has lost much of its luster as the foremost supporter of
human rights, such as the Middle East. Although plausible, any public
relations benefits accruing from the potential admission of thousands of
refugees from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan are tenuous, especially
when compared with the significant cost of integrating thousands of
impoverished refugees. As such, the national interest justifications historically relied upon as the bases for asylum law appear inapplicable in
the terrorism context and do not justify the inclusion of millions of refugees fleeing terrorist persecution.
Arguably, asylum coverage of terrorism refugees could also be premised upon a moral obligation to provide shelter to oppressed allies,
particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan where the United States unwittingly
contributed to the rise of terrorist persecution. This argument finds some
historical support in the use of asylum after the 1956 Hungarian Revolt
against Soviet apparatchiks, whereby 40,000 Hungarians were granted
refuge in the United States after the CIA funded and supported the illfated uprising.' Although this use of asylum accorded with the anticommunist ethos of the period, the strikingly large number of admitted
refugees reflected a deeper sense of responsibility for contributing to the
crisis. Similarly, in the case of Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian
refugees, the United States granted asylum to significant numbers out of
"a sense of obligation to a people the United States had supported and
rather than solely due to foreign policy
then abandoned,"'
considerations.
135. Zaring & Baylis, supra note 110, at 1385.
136. Waibsnaider, supra note 118, at 403.
137. Bockley, supra note 81, at 276.
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Although this justification provides some support for utilizing
existing asylum laws to protect Iraqi and Afghani refugees, there are
clear distinctions between the multitudes of refugees targeted by terrorists as a result of their religious and sectarian loyalties and the refugees who directly aligned with United States insurgency efforts during
the political wars of the Cold War. A more comparable example would
involve Iraqis and Afghanis who specifically fought with the United
States against terrorist factions and now fear for their well-being due to
this specific alliance. In this context, the United States would likely have
a greater moral obligation to apply its asylum laws to protect the individual refugees. Such a principled obligation would not, however,
extend to generally targeted refugees, making the application of asylum
law to the thousands of terrorism-related refugees unwarranted on this
basis.
Without a foreign policy imperative or a direct moral obligation to
protect the refugees, the remaining justification for applying asylum law
to the current terrorism conflicts must be premised on humanitarian concerns. As previously discussed, the asylum laws were updated in 1980 to
better display America's commitment to human rights and the protection
of the oppressed."" Yet in spite of these concerns, Congress expressed
anxiety that a large number of refugees could potentially overwhelm the
country's ability to absorb and integrate the influx.139 Congress further
emphasized the need to strictly limit and control the total number of
refugees annually admitted. 40 Consequently, the nation's asylum policy
is based upon an annual balancing of the humanitarian concern for refugees against the domestic costs of immigration and assimilation.14 1
In the instant terrorism context, it is unlikely that the high financial,
cultural, and security burden of integrating thousands of foreign refugees
from disparate backgrounds would skew the cost-benefit analysis in
favor of applying the asylum laws to the multitudes of new refugees.
Since most Iraqi, Afghani, and Sudanese refugees are destitute and
escaped their nations under generally abhorrent circumstances, the government would need to allocate immense resources to provide for their
health, energy, food, education, and general societal integration,14 2 a
138. See supra Part IV.
139. See H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 10 (1979).

140. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (2006).
141. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 66, at

§ 33.04[4].
142. See Benjamin Cook, Note, Method in its Madness: The Endowment Effect in an Analysis
of Refugee Burden-Sharing and a Proposed Refugee Market, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 333, 338
(2004) ('The political, environmental, or other strains that may come from admitting protection
seekers can impose significant costs on a country, but . . . to what extent is simply too difficult to
quantify."); Donald D. Slesnick II & Jennifer K. Poltrock, Public Sector Bargaining in the Mid90s (the 1980s Were Challenging, but This Is Ridiculous)-a Union Perspective, 25 J.L. & EDuc.
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burden that all of the current refugee-hosting countries have found
unbearable.14 3 Even ignoring the cultural differences and security implications, the United States is unlikely to finance such an expensive
endeavor just for the sake of protecting human rights, without significant
foreign policy benefits and without a sense of moral obligation. In fact,
considering that greater admissions of terrorism refugees would incentivize other refugees to seek entry to the United States, one response to
the potential asylum onslaught would actually favor lowering the number of annually admitted refugees as a disincentive.
Fundamentally, if the motivation behind United States policy is to
protect the oppressed from continued persecution, nothing precludes the
advancement of humanitarian interests through means other than asylum. By way of example, increased financial assistance and the allocation of resources to those countries currently hosting the refugees could
largely serve the humanitarian mission at the center of asylum policy.
While Iraqi, Afghani, and Sudanese refugees may be unable to avail
themselves of the protection of their home countries, these refugees have
generally not suffered from extensive persecution in the neighboring
states of Syria, Jordan, Iran, India, and Chad, where many refugees and
refugee camps are located. Rather than encouraging and providing for
the immigration of these refugees to the United States, the active support
of these countries' efforts would align with the United States' traditional
humanitarian ethos, while avoiding the significant costs of maintaining
the asylum applicants domestically. Additionally, support of third-party
host nations would minimize the urgency for refugees to seek resettlement elsewhere, potentially limiting the strain upon an already overextended asylum system.
In light of the considerable costs and the attenuated benefits, the
furtherance of humanitarian values does not alone sufficiently justify the
application of the asylum laws to applicants fleeing terrorist persecution
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan. To remedy any inconsistency between
national interests and current asylum law, Congress has several legislative tools at its disposal. As an initial matter, it is politically impossible
to solidify the country's border control capabilities to prevent unauthorized entry by refugees from terrorism-stricken countries. Consequently,
tightening the statutory regulations to diminish eligibility for refugees
claiming a generalized fear of persecution solely due to nationwide ter661, 662 n.3 (1996) (noting "the added cost of integrating large numbers of non-English-speaking
immigrants and refugees into the student bodies of inner city and suburban schools").
143. See John Zarocostas, Syria Calls Refugee Burden Overwhelming,
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rorism would minimize abuses of the system. Unlike the current regulations, which do not require evidence of individual persecution where the
asylum applicant establishes a pattern or practice "of persecution of a
group of persons similarly situated to the applicant,"' updated language could be narrowly tailored to require a reasonable possibility that
a particular applicant would be individually targeted by terrorists, rather
than merely belonging to a protected group targeted by terrorists. Such
an amendment would also collaterally benefit those refugees actually
possessing an individualized and genuine fear of persecution. By significantly curtailing the overall number of refugees capable of meeting the
higher threshold for demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution,
the new text would decrease competition for the limited numerical allotment and would disincentivize entry to the United States by ineligible
refugees. As a result, those refugees entering illegally or under false pretenses would be processed in the same manner as all other illegal immigrants and deported if found ineligible for asylum relief.
Furthermore, Congress or the executive agencies charged with
administering the INA must allocate greater resources and improve
training for asylum officers and immigration judges, who too often
demonstrate an uncanny ability to incorrectly adjudicate asylum applications. In the absence of Congressional action to limit the scope of the
asylum provisions, the government will depend upon these asylum
officers to exercise an enormous amount of discretion to effectively and
efficiently determine the eligibility of numerous similarly situated refugees. The current level of administration leaves much to be desired.
Alternatively, even if Congress's humanitarian concerns
predominate above other factors and the legislature is prepared to welcome an influx of refugees from terrorism-afflicted countries, only one
legislative change is needed. Congress should address the basic unfairness of permitting an unlimited number of illegal entrants to receive
asylum, while severely restricting the asylum opportunities for similarlysituated refugees who follow legal protocol and apply for refugee status
while in exile. Under the current system, refugees who enter illegally are
rewarded with an opportunity to apply for asylum, incentivizing other
refugees to utilize the same illegal approach. Although the dimensions
of United States' immigration policy as it relates to illegal entry are
outside the scope of this Essay, the same divisive factors are at play
here, and should be addressed.

144. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A) (2007).
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CONCLUSION

The purpose of asylum law is to continue the tradition of providing
the oppressed with opportunities to settle in the United States. Yet the
current system is arguably ill-equipped to accomplish this task.
Although the general policy, as expressed both in the statute and legislative history, favors humanitarian assistance for the displaced, the laws
are at once exclusionary and encouraging of entry for asylum-eligible
refugees fleeing terrorism. At the same time, practical considerations of
cost and assimilation suggest that increases in refugee admissions should
not be encouraged. Finally, as a normative matter, the utility from
expanding asylum policy to encompass additional numbers of refugees
is greatly outweighed by the national interests at stake. It is unclear
whether asylum alternatives exist for aligning the humanitarian mission
with pragmatic considerations of controlled entry. Most any system,
including a lottery or ranking system, would continue to suffer from
similar difficulties in balancing the competing interests.
Because asylum applicants are refugees who are unable to return to
their home countries due to fear of persecution, the denial of entry is
significantly more harmful than for regular immigration applicants. At
the same time, the processing and admission of all eligible refugees
would create unmanageable domestic repercussions. Conceding that
most refugees from terrorism-prone regions do not currently seek admission to the United States, current law and policy would likely fail to
respond if even a fragment of the millions of refugees displaced by terrorism increased their efforts to seek asylum in the United States.

